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Abstract
This paper examines empirically a range of theoretical hypotheses about the determi-
nants of FDI location in a panel data regression framework. The results of the estimation
of a gravity model lend support to the proximity-concentration and internalisation hypothe-
ses. Also, the fact that FDI has been found to be decreasing in the competition posed by
alternative locations is suggestive of the superiority of the share version of the gravity model
over its classical formulation. A panel data cointegration-type analysis between FDI and
GDP, and per capita income di®erential suggests that GDP has a positive impact on FDI,
but provide mixed evidence as to whether per capita income di®erential re°ects demand or
supply determinants of FDI. Causality tests between income, income di®erential and FDI
points to FDI playing a positive role on economic growth and convergence.
JEL Classi¯cation: C23; F21; F23
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, multinational enterprises, gravity model, dynamic
panel data model, panel data cointegration
1 Introduction
As globalisation reaches the remotest economies in the world, an increasing number of ¯rms
engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) for an increasing number of reasons, in a widening
array of locations, in order to take advantage of the spawning business opportunities and also
to better accommodate the blistering pace of technological change. From the host countries
standpoint, FDI is generally reckoned as \good news" because, abstaining from the controversy
of whether it constitutes a relevant source of aggregate capital, FDI is perceived as fostering
sustained long term growth and promoting convergence between the developing economies that
manage to lure large °ows of FDI on a sustained basis and the developed countries. In the
sense that the ability of countries in attracting sustained °ows of FDI hinges decisively on
certain country-speci¯c characteristics, trying to pin down empirically the general determinants
of the locational choice of FDI is a crucial task that, although with few notable exceptions, has
received scarce attention in the literature. Thus, in this paper we evaluate empirically a range
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1of theoretical hypotheses about the determinants of the location of multinational activity in a
panel data regression framework.
The international economics literature has proposed several theories for the emergence of
multinational enterprises (MNE). Of these, three stand out: the \proximity-concentration" hy-
pothesis, the \factor-proportions" hypothesis and the \internalisation" hypothesis.
The proximity-concentration hypothesis explains the ¯rm's choice between the two alter-
natives modes of foreign penetration, exporting and overseas expansion, as depending on the
trade-o® between the advantages related to proximity to the foreign market and the economies
of scale that might result from the concentration of production (Krugman, 1983, Horstmann and
Markusen, 1992, Brainard, 1993b, 1997). The models that underlie this hypothesis assume that
each ¯rm operate within a di®erentiated goods sectors. This sector is characterised by increasing
returns at the ¯rm level due to some input that can be easily spread among di®erent production
facilities, scale economies at the plant level, such that unit costs are decreasing with the plant
size, and a variable transport cost. In this setup, and ignoring factor-proportions discrepancies,
the proximity-concentration hypothesis predicts that FDI will tend to prevail relative to export-
ing the more di±cult is the access to the foreign market, i.e. the higher are transport costs and
trade barriers, and the lower are the economies of scale at the plant level relative to those at
the ¯rm level. Since the market-size hypothesis holds that if there are economies of scale ¯rms
will tend to invest in the larger foreign markets and export to the smaller ones in order to reap
scale advantages and minimise transport costs, it can be said that the proximity-concentration
hypothesis nests the market-size hypothesis of FDI location.
The factor-proportions hypothesis (Helpman, 1984, Markusen, 1984, Helpman and Krugman,
1985, Ethier and Horn, 1990) explains FDI location in terms of the combination of relative
factor endowments with the characteristics of the production technology. In this context, if the
production technology is such that di®erent production stages have di®erent factor-intensities,
FDI may emerge as a viable way of exploiting lower factor costs. In the simplest case, where
headquarters activities are capital-intensive and plant activities are labour-intensive, a single-
plant MNE might emerge in order to exploit di®erent factor costs. In particular, the ¯rm
will place its headquarters in the capital-abundant market and concentrate production in the
labour-abundant location, exporting back to the headquarters market. In spite of assigning some
opposite roles to some variables (e.g. regarding transport costs), these two hypothesis are not
necessarily mutually exclusive (Brainard, 1997), since the proximity-concentration hypothesis is
essentially tailored to explain horizontal FDI whereas the factor-proportions hypothesis is more
suitable to account for the emergence of vertical FDI. In empirical terms, we would expect the
proximity-concentration hypothesis to hold better for aggregate FDI °ows, since horizontal FDI
(especially among developed economies) accounts for the bulk of global FDI.
The \internalisation" hypothesis (Ethier, 1986, Horstmann and Markusen, 1987, Dunning,
1988, 1993, Ethier and Markusen, 1996) assumes that MNEs have ¯rm-speci¯c advantages that
are better explored internally, rather than licensed or sold to a local ¯rm because of the risk of
assets dissipation, which gives rise to overseas expansion. It accrues that, if the ¯rm's products
require a local presence in order to maintain quality control, brand reputation or even to adapt
to local tastes, then FDI will prevail as the mode of foreign market penetration.
Linder (1961) argued that countries with similar per capita incomes tend to have similar
demand structures and so to consume similar consumption bundles. In spite of having been
thought to characterise international trade °ows, the Linder hypothesis can also be applied to
FDI in which case intra-industry FDI between two countries with similar per capita incomes
would emerge in order to exploit the two countries similar \tastes". Therefore, to the extent that
per capita income di®erentials constitutes a good proxy for factor-proportions di®erences, the
Linder and the factor-proportions hypotheses of FDI yield opposite predictions, since the former
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The theory has identi¯ed other factors capable of conditioning the geographical distribution
of FDI. The location of FDI should be sensible to cost-related variables, such as corporate taxes
and labour costs. In what concerns corporate taxes, there is an extensive literature evaluating
the e®ects of tax rates on FDI. Naturally, ¯rms should prefer producing in locations where the
tax rate is relatively lower (Grubbert and Mutti, 1991, Holland and Owens, 1996, Brainard,
1997, Hau°er and Wooton, 1997). The economies of agglomeration have also been put forward
as a relevant determinant of FDI location in the sense that existing foreign ventures in a given
foreign location somehow pave the way for further overseas expansion by other MNEs (see e.g.
Wheeler and Mody, 1992, Head, Ries and Swenson, 1995, Cheng and Kwan, 2000).
Processes of economic integration also seem to in°uence the patterns of FDI dispersion
(for a recent discussion on this issue see Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997). Regional integration
has typically been thought as of producing two type of e®ects: static and dynamic. As for
the static e®ects, regional integration has two con°icting e®ects on inter-regional FDI. On the
one hand tari®-hopping FDI is likely to be reduced as trade barriers are lifted. On the other
hand, the elimination of investment barriers and greater openness, which supposedly stimulates
cross-border investment, would bring about larger intra-regional FDI °ows. In what concerns
inter-regional FDI, the creation of a trade area may increase the level of protectionism relative
to the rest of the word thereby generating tari®-hopping FDI. Regional integration is also likely
to generate dynamic e®ects that will a®ect positively FDI in°ows. That is because regional
integration is bound to promote greater e±ciency and economic growth, and also because a
larger integrated market normally leads to ¯rm mergers and increases the scope for economies
of scale. Given the con°icting nature of the di®erent e®ects of economic integration on FDI, the
particular direction of the overall impact of regional integration is an empirical matter.
One central goal of the present analysis is to test empirically the above described theoretical
determinants of FDI location. We will be concerned with testing those determinants jointly
as to avoid as much as possible any omitted variable bias that is arguably pervasive in the
empirical contributions that are concentrated in testing locational theories of FDI in isolation.
Our econometric exercise is carried out using data on FDI out°ows of United States (U.S.) MNEs
disaggregated at industry level to a sample of several host countries. The empirical framework
that we chose to test the locational determinants of U.S. FDI belongs to the family of the
gravity models, which have been the workhorse of empirical applications in the international
economics domain. In fact, since Linnemann (1961), gravity models have been used frequently
in empirical work to assess trade °ows and most recently to assess FDI (Brainard, 1997, Lipsey,
1999). The theoretical underpinnings of trade under the classical gravity model suggest that
transport costs and trade barriers should discourage trade since they raise imports prices. These
two variables are thought to have the opposite e®ect on FDI, implying that FDI and trade can
be seen as alternative modes of foreign market penetration (see e.g. Horst, 1972b,a, Caves, 1974,
Brainard, 1997). In this context, several empirical studies on the determinants of FDI have
been criticised because, ¯rst, the exporting alternative is not endogeneised, and second, it can
only relate the stock of foreign investment at a given time to tari®s rates at that time1 (Caves,
1996, Brainard, 1997). Recognising the interdependence of FDI and exporting, the present study
includes variables that proxy for transport costs and trade and FDI barriers in our gravity model.
The particular version of the gravity model that we employ is the share gravity model
proposed in Mello-Sampayo (2000) and summarily described in x4.1. In short, the share version
of the gravity model adds to the classical version a competition factor that captures the gravity of
1When FDI is subject to sunk costs it can appear unrelated to trade related determinants even if that causal
relation was in force when the original investments were made. Studies that analysed °ows of foreign investments
have been more successful in ¯nding a relation between FDI and trade policy (Caves, 1996).
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directed to one speci¯c location as interdependent with the FDI decisions concerning alternative
locations. In the sense that the validity of the share version of the gravity model implies that
the classical version (that has been extensively used in empirical applications in international
economics) is misspeci¯ed, testing the empirical validity of the share version constitutes another
central goal of this paper.
To anticipate the results, the choice for the share version rather than the classical formulation
of the gravity model seems to be vindicated by the data as the coe±cient of the competition
factor has been found to be negative and highly signi¯cant. Moreover, the econometric results
suggest that FDI shares are increasing in transport costs, barriers to trade, FDI openness and
market size (population), and decreasing in the scale economies at the plant level relative to
the corporate level. These results provide unequivocal support to the proximity-concentration
hypothesis. As expected, corporate taxes were found to have a detrimental impact on FDI. We
also include a measure of each country's protection of intellectual property rights as a means of
testing the internalisation hypothesis, since this hypothesis suggests that MNEs choose locations
where its proprietary advantages are relatively more protected. The results seem to lend support
to the internalisation hypothesis as the share of FDI has been found to be positively related
to the degree of property rights protection. Finally, the location of U.S. MNEs' activities was
also found to be highly persistent across destinations, suggesting the presence of agglomeration
e®ects.
The fact that the levels of the FDI measures used in this application and the income variables,
namely GDP and per capita income di®erential against the U.S. were found to be nonstationary
implied that the impact of the income variables on FDI could not be evaluated under the
share gravity model, since the GMM methodology that we use to estimate is only valid for
stationary variables. Thus, a cointegration analysis in the context of panel data was employed
with two further goals in mind. First, as a way of complementing the share gravity model,
we test the \market size" hypothesis, this time using GDP as proxy for market size, and also
whether di®erences in per capita income vis-µ a-vis the U.S. constitute demand determinants of
FDI, as suggested by the Linder hypothesis, or supply determinants, as predicted by the factor-
proportions hypothesis. The overall results suggest that GDP has a positive impact on FDI,
thereby lending further support to the market size hypothesis, but provide mixed evidence as to
whether per capita income di®erential re°ects demand or supply determinants of FDI. Second,
we conducted Granger-causality tests as a simple means of testing the long run role of FDI
on economic growth and convergence. We seem to ¯nd evidence of reverse causality between
the relevant income variables and FDI, suggesting that FDI plays a positive role in economic
development and also in narrowing the gap between developing and developed countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the related empirical literature is brie°y
reviewed. Then, the data and the estimation method are described and the results of the
share gravity model discussed. Finally, the estimation methods for the nonstationary data are
described and the relevant results analysed.
2 Related Empirical Literature
Empirical research on the locational pattern of multinational activities has focused on a wide
range of issues. Those include relative factor prices and separation factors, such as transport
costs, trade and foreign investment barriers. Other explanatory variables that have been looked
upon as in°uencing FDI are directly related to the host country's idiosyncrasies, such as market
size and economies of scale, market and institutional characteristics, such as exchange rate and
4political stability and the income tax policy. Firm speci¯c advantages have also featured promi-
nently among empirical studies, since intangible assets are deemed to be much more relevant to
FDI than physical capital assets (see Markusen, 1995).
With regard to the speci¯c advantages of a foreign location, the market size brings down
the average ¯xed cost of investing abroad. Scale factors a®ecting the absorptive capacity of
the host country have been generally found to in°uence positively the locational decisions of
MNEs (Grubbert and Mutti, 1991, Brainard, 1993a, 1997, Goldberg and Klein, 1996, Lipsey,
1999, 2000). Grubbert and Mutti (1991) found the low level of corporate taxes to be a decisive
factor in attracting FDI in°ows from the U.S., which contrasts with the results obtained in
Lipsey (1999) and Wheeler and Mody (1992). Grubbert and Mutti (1991) also found that trade
restrictions play a crucial role in attracting FDI in°ows as long as the local market supports the
subsidiaries' production. Brainard (1993a, 1997) rejects the factor-proportions hypothesis as a
general explanation for the location of aggregate FDI. However, Brainard (1993a) ¯nds more
compelling evidence in favour of the factor-proportions hypothesis when a distinction is made
between a±liate production for sale in the local market and that exported back to the a±liate's
parent market, because factor proportions should be particularly relevant for vertical FDI.
Other empirical studies have focused on the industry speci¯c characteristics that lead to
foreign production rather than to exporting. In Lall (1980), economies of scale, when used as
the only exogenous variable, have a greater positive e®ect on FDI than on exports, a somewhat
puzzling result, since it would be expected that economies of scale would favour the concentration
of production. This counter-intuitive outcome could be attributed to the fact that the regression
used by Lall su®ers from the problem of omitted variables (positive) bias arguably stemming
from the positive correlation existing between economies of scale and variables such as market
power and ¯rm size, which tend to a®ect positively FDI. Another important ¯nding of Lall
(1980) is that \mobile" proprietary advantages such as product di®erentiation and R&D seem
to promote FDI. In a study for Canada and the U.K., Caves (1974) found that in both countries
economies of scale and ownership advantages are determinant in explaining the emergence of
MNEs in industries characterised by concentration and high barriers to entry. Brainard (1997)
tested and gathered favourable evidence for the proximity-concentration hypothesis by ¯nding
that a±liate sales respond positively to transport costs and trade barriers and negatively to
investment barriers and production scale economies.
In sum, the empirical literature on FDI generally supports the claim that MNEs respond to
a wide range of stimuli. Thus, an econometric analysis that concentrates on a reduced number
of factors necessarily provides only a partial account of the determinants of FDI and incurs in a
higher \risk" of omitted variables bias. In an attempt to avoid such problems, this paper pursues
an eclectic approach that accommodates several variables in order to provide an overall view of
the determinants that lead MNEs to choose a particular foreign production location over others
and at the same time test the most prominent theories of FDI location. Looking at the related
literature, our paper comes closest to Brainard (1997). As in there, we use data on U.S. MNEs to
test the proximity-concentration, factor-proportions and internalisation hypotheses and arrive
at similar qualitative conclusions. However, unlike Brainard (1997) who takes a cross-section
approach, we carry out our estimation within a panel data framework, which arguably allows us
to ge more reliable estimates and inference, and perhaps more importantly, to take avantage of
the time series dimension of our data set to explore the long run relationship between FDI and
income variables. Moreover, unlike Brainard (1997) who uses the classical version of the gravity
model, we use the share gravity formulation, which includes a competition factor that according
to Mello-Sampayo (2000) enhances the speci¯cation of the gravity model for the analysis of the
location of multinational activity.
53 Data
The data set in the present application consists of outward FDI °ows, broken-down by sector,
emanated from the U.S. and targeted at a panel of countries. There are at least two good reasons
for choosing U.S. MNEs when analysing the issues related to FDI location. First, a large share
of worldwide MNEs' headquarters are located in the U.S.. Since MNEs around the world seem
to be driven by broadly the same goals, the behaviour of American multinationals should give a
fairly good idea of the location decisions of other countries' MNEs. Second, and most crucially,
disaggregated data on FDI and on operations of foreign a±liates are extremely di±cult to gather.
Yet, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce conducts
compulsory outward investment surveys2 in which the concepts and de¯nitions are consistent,
thus providing reliable data across countries and industries.
The host countries were selected as to embrace countries of the world's main economic
regions, and to highlight the duality between developed and developing countries. Our sample
incorporates countries with di®erent cultures, income, organisation and infrastructures as well
as with di®ering geographical proximity to the U.S.. The list of countries is: United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Mexico
and Canada. As of 1996, these countries accounted for around 60 percent of the total U.S.
outward FDI. In what concerns the sectorial breakdown, the FDI data pertaining to each host
country is disaggregated into 14 di®erent industries3.
In the speci¯c form of the gravity model employed here, we use the share of U.S. MNEs'
activities allocated to each country in the panel as the dependent variable. Since we use shares
of FDI located to each country in the panel, we are controlling for the determinants of trade
°ows that are common to all alternative FDI locations, leaving only unaccounted the changes of
the trade-o® between FDI and exporting that are speci¯c to each country. The use of panel data
and of a dynamic speci¯cation of the share gravity model enables, to some extent, to control for
the discrepancy between the trade policy at a time and FDI at that time.
3.1 The FDI Series (Dependent Variable)
FDI is commonly measured by the stock or °ow of capital as de¯ned by the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) due to its ready availability and consistency across time and countries. This
commonly used measure of MNEs' activity is a ¯nancial concept made for balance of payments
purposes and does not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence with real activities4. In or-
der to overcome this limitation, four other measures of FDI are added to capital stock, namely,
total assets, total sales, number of employees and employment compensation. In spite of FDI
being a °ow variable, some of its crucial dimensions are best conveyed by stock variables, such
as the total assets or the number of employees pertaining to a foreign a±liate of a MNE. That
is why the selected set of FDI measures includes both stocks and °ows. In addition, the use
of ¯ve di®erent measures of MNEs' activities allows testing the robustness of the econometric
results to several di®erent measures of the same phenomenon.
Under the BEA's survey, the U.S. FDI data are presented for U.S. nonbank foreign a±liates of
nonbank U.S. parents. Capital stock is equal to U.S. parents' equity in, and net outstanding loans
to, their foreign a±liates. So, under this measure of FDI, the U.S. FDI may become negative
when the loans from a±liates to the parents exceed the equity and loans to the a±liates. In some
2The survey is available on-line at http://www.bea.doc.gov/.
3The classi¯cation is based on the Standard Industrial Classi¯cation (SIC) Revision 2 Classi¯cation (Standard
Industrial Classi¯cation Manual, 1987). See appendix A
4A good example of this mismatch is the foreign investment into \tax-havens".
6cases, totalling well below one percent of the overall sample observations, the direct investment
position is negative. Since the original series are to be transformed in logarithms, those cells
are replaced by a positive value close to zero in the original series, such that their logarithmic
transformed exist. This solution, albeit ad-hoc, prevents dropping Malaysia, Indonesia and the
Philippines o® the sample, which seems worthwhile given the extremely small number of such
occurrences.
Foreign a±liates' total assets are equal to the sum of total owners' equity in a±liates held
by both U.S. parents and all other persons and total liabilities owed by a±liates to both U.S.
parents and all other persons. Total sales include sales of goods and services and are de¯ned
as gross sales minus returns, allowances, and discounts or as gross operating revenues, both
exclusive of sales and consumption taxes levied directly on consumers, net value-added taxes,
and excise taxes levied on manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. The number of employees is
de¯ned as the full-time and part-time employees on the payroll at the end of the ¯scal year. The
employment compensation (wages and salaries per employee) data cover the full year. Reported
employee compensation data often covered only the portion of the year that the business was in
the direct investment universe.
It is important to note that the data in the BEA's tables were suppressed if showing them
would disclose the data for individual companies. In addition, it is often necessary to suppress
other cells that, by subtraction from a common total or subtotal, could be used to derive the
primary suppressed cell in the same or related table. However, this constitutes less than 5 per
cent of the total and the omitted cells were ¯ltered following ranges' approximations derived
from the country and industry totals, whenever possible5.
3.2 Competition Factor
The competition factor is a composite variable that attempts to capture the gravity of the
competing destinations (see Mello-Sampayo, 2000). The competition factor (CFijt) is the sum,
weighted by transport costs relative to industry j, of all other countries' characteristics (except
country i) in attracting FDI from the U.S..
To proxy the country's overall characteristics in attracting U.S. FDI, GDP per capita at
purchasing power parity (GDPPPP) taken from World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY)6, is









ijt is an index that measures the competition faced industry j of country i, and TCUS
ijt
stands for transport costs. GDPPPP is a prime indicator of the demand per capita as it measures
the local consumers' real purchasing power, and the higher the consumers' purchasing power the
more a ¯rm will want to produce locally in order to fully exploit the market potential. Further,
GDPPPP is highly correlated with the variables used in this study to analyse the determinants
of U.S. FDI location (e.g. labour productivity, FDI openness) and so is arguably able to capture
the overall characteristics of the local market. However, in order to avoid multicollinearity
problems, the GDP per capita PPP will be only used to compute the competition factor.
5This procedure draws on the fact that panel data is used. The gaps are approximated by distributing the
remaining of the total across the correspondent industry and country. Although still arbitrary, the procedure has
the advantage of bridging gaps by two criteria.
6The WCY is published annualy by the IMD International, Geneva, Switzerland.
73.3 Transport Costs
The gravity model emphasises the signi¯cance of transport costs in determining the pattern of the
interactions °ows, Masahisa Fujita and Venables (1999). Formal treatments of the gravity model,
such as in Bergstrand (1989, 1990), have assumed an exogenous transport cost (c:i:f:=f:o:b:)
factor in shipping goods between countries. Hence, only a portion of a shipment arrives at its
destination with the part lost in transit representing the resources exhausted to ship the output7
(Krugman, 1980, Helpman and Krugman, 1985).
Very often in empirical applications, the physical distance between economic centers is used
to proxy the separation factors in the gravity model (Linnemann, 1961, Bergstrand, 1985, 1989,
1990). Notwithstanding, Kau and Sirmans (1979) suggest that studies using physical distance
as a proxy for the time cost of travel will overstate the impact of transport cost on spatial
interaction. At the industry level, Brainard (1997) argues that any reasonably accurate measure
of the cost of interaction between two places should re°ect not only the physical distance, but also
speci¯c product characteristics. For that purpose, Brainard (1997) uses the ratio of freight and
insurance charges to import values, whilst Harrigan (1993) employs the ratio of import values
on a c:i:f: basis to the corresponding trading partner's export value on a f:o:b: basis. Another
point has to do with the fact that, since we are trying to explain FDI decisions, our measure
of transport costs should account for the trade-o® faced by the multinational ¯rm between the
two alternative modes of foreign penetration: exports and FDI. That is because the higher the
costs related to exports incurred by the ¯rm the greater its incentive to expand its production
capacity at the target location. Taking this issues on board and following both Brainard (1997)
and Harrigan (1993), we created the following series to proxy for transport costs at the industry
level, for the period 1988-1996:
TCUS
ij =




£ (US Shipped to A±liates)US
ij (2)
The variable TCUS
ij captures the transport cost of exports between the U.S. parent in industry
j and its foreign a±liate in country i. Both the denominator and numerator of the ratio in
(2) were obtained from the BEA's U.S. Balance-of-Payments data8. Other transport receipts
primarily covers transactions for freight and port services for the transport of goods by ocean,
air, and lorry from the U.S.. The denominator, \export value" covers the free alongside ship
(f:a:s) value of merchandise at the U.S. port of export, based on the transaction price including
inland freight, insurance and other charges incurred in placing the merchandise alongside the
carrier at the U.S. port of export.
The cost of transport per U.S. dollar exported to country i is then multiplied by U.S. exports
(value) shipped to a±liates, country of a±liate by industry of a±liate, from the BEA. The
merchandise trade data from BEA are reported on a \shipped"" basis, i.e., on the basis of when
and to (or by) whom the goods were physically shipped. Exports of U.S. parents shipped to
foreign a±liates are disaggregated into the 14 product categories (industries). The choice of
computing transport costs for exports rather than for total trade is explained by the fact that,
as far as transport costs are concerned, exports are the main alternative to FDI. Appendix B
contains the average cost of transport per U.S. dollar exported to each country in the panel, with
the highest average value for the Philippines and the lowest for Mexico and Canada. Hence,
this series seems reasonable in approximating country-speci¯c transport costs. Although not
reported here, when multiplying the obtained transport costs series by the U.S. exports (value)
7This is known as the \iceberg" transport technology: for every unit shipped, only 1=¿ units arrive, for ¿ > 1.
8The U.S. exports to Spain, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand were drawn from the World Trade
Tables.
8shipped to a±liates, country of a±liate by industry of a±liate, in order to approximate industry-
speci¯c transport costs, the resulting series also seems sensible, since its highest values are for
industries such as transport equipment (I9) and its lowest values for industries such as ¯nance,
insurance and real estate (I12).
3.4 Barriers
As is well known, data on tari®s and non-tari®s barriers (NTBs) are very di±cult to gather and
not easily comparable across countries. Yet, the WCY presents two measures of openness using
survey data: the trade openness and the FDI openness indices, for the period 1990-1997. The
WCY uses two types of data to capture quantitative and qualitative information separately. The
hard data comprises statistical indicators obtained from supranational, international, national
and regional organisations and statitics o±ces. The soft data is compiled from the executive
opinion survey, which is an in-depth 87-item (criteria) questionnaire sent to executives in each
country analysed.
We use the WCY's trade openness index to generate a trade barrier index (TRP), which
aggregates information on tari®s and NTBs and is decreasing in the degree of openness to trade9.
Hence, the trade barrier index is expected to have an overall positive impact on the share of
U.S. FDI (Horst, 1972b, Caves, 1974, Grubbert and Mutti, 1991, Brainard, 1997). The countries
more open to trade are the Netherlands and the U.K. and the least open are the \New Tiger"
countries (see ¯gure 1).
The FDI openness index (FDIO) is increasing in the degree of openness to FDI and is
expected to have an overall positive impact on the share of U.S. FDI. The countries in the panel
with the greater barriers to foreign investors are Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, those with
a more open stance are the Netherlands, U.K. and Germany (see ¯gure 2).
3.5 Other Data
Data on the intellectual property right (IPR) index are taken from the WCY for the period
1990-1997. The higher the index, the more the intellectual property is adequately protected.
IPR is included as a proxy for the host market's legal and regulatory framework compatibility
with the operations of foreign-owned ¯rms. As well known, ¯rm-speci¯c assets that confer MNEs
proprietary advantages, i.e. technology, brand name, product design, managerial technique and
so forth, are a necessary condition for the emergence of MNEs. Hence, MNEs will more likely
invest in a country where their assets are well protected. In the sense that better intellectual
property rights protection reduces the risk of the ¯rm-speci¯c assets dissipation, the variable
IPR can be used to test the importance of the internalisation hypothesis. In regard to the sample
IPR series, Germany appears on top and Thailand at the bottom of the panel (see ¯gure 3).
GDP per employee per hour in U.S. dollars from the WCY is used to proxy for labour pro-
ductivity (LP) for the period 1990-1997. Cushman (1987)10 ¯nds that low labour costs in itself
are an insigni¯cant advantage unless low labour costs can be matched with high productivity.
Therefore, it is expected a positive relation between labour productivity and in°ows of FDI.
Also, to the extent that labour productivity constitutes a good measure of the factor propor-
tions, LP can be used to test the factor-proportions hypothesis of FDI. The country with the
9The trade barrier index for country i in the sample was constructed by subtracting from the overall maximum
value for the WCY's trade openness index series the value of the trade openness index recorded for country i. In
this way we turn the trade openness index, which is increasing in the degree of openness to trade, into a measure
that is decreasing in the degree of openness to trade.
10Cushman argues that non-U.S. productivity is the most important of the various labour-related cost variables
in determining FDI over the period 1963-1981.
9highest LP is France, followed closely by Germany. Indonesia has the lowest LP in the panel
(see ¯gure 4).
Another cost-related factor included in our study is the level of taxation in the host country.
Data on corporate taxes (CT) on pro¯ts, income and capital gains as a percentage of GDP are
taken from WCY for the period 1989-1996. The country with the highest level of taxation is
Indonesia where CT represents on average 8 percent of GDP (see ¯gure 5).
The theory distinguishes between scale economies at the corporate and plant level. Scale
economies at the corporate level are typically induced by ¯rm-speci¯c assets that are easily
spread across di®erent plants and at a low cost. Examples of ¯rm-speci¯c assets are technology,
management, marketing services as well as patents and trademarks. R&D, advertising and
technical and scienti¯c workers are frequently used as proxies for ¯rm-speci¯c assets (Markunsen,
1995). Since such data are not available for our panel, we use the number of non-production
employees from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. Census Bureau for the period 1988-1997.
From ¯gure 6, manufacturing (I3) appears at the top but with a downward trend, other industries
(I14) and services (I3) follow with an upward trend. Similarly, scale economies at the plant level
or economies of scale based on physical capital intensity are proxied by the number of production
workers from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. Census Bureau for the period 1988-1997. These
economies of scales variables along with transport costs, barrier variables and market size will
be pivotal in testing the validity of the proximity-concentration hypothesis.
Data on GDP at current prices, GDP per capita di®erential vis-µ a-vis the U.S. (GDPDIF)
and population (POP) are taken from the IFS of the IMF for the period 1982-1997. GDP and
POP have been widely used in the gravity models analysing trade °ows11. GDP is used to proxy
for market income-size and population to proxy for market demographic-size (see ¯gures 7 and
8). GDP per capita di®erential (GDPDIF) is the absolute value of the di®erential in per capita
GDP between the U.S. and each country in the panel. GDPDIF is included to test the factor-
proportions hypothesis. The countries with higher GDPDIF are the \New Tiger" countries and
Mexico (see ¯gure 9).
We consider an additional measure of FDI, the level of U.S. out°ows of capital stock, ag-
gregated over industry, including banking, into each country in the panel. Data on aggregated
capital stocks (AKS) for 1982-1998 are taken from BEA. AKS data are presented for U.S. foreign
a±liates of U.S. parents. In ¯gure 10 it is observed that, according to this measure of FDI, the
U.K. is the largest recipient of U.S. FDI, followed by Canada. At the bottom of the list come
the developing countries.
3.6 Unit Root Tests
Since the appropriateness of the methodology to be applied to the econometric estimation de-
pends on the time series properties of the data, such properties must be ascertained before any
estimation is carried out. There are several statistics that may be used to test for a unit root
in panel data, but since we have a short-panel data set, we employ the Im, Pesaran and Shin
(2003) t-bar statistic, which is based on the mean augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics
calculated independently for each cross-section of the panel.
The unavailability of diagnosis tests for the presence of deterministic components in the
ADF regressions implies that the unit root tests are carried out using several combinations
of deterministic components. In the cases where the results regarding the existence of unit
root di®er for di®erent models, we pick the model whose deterministic components seem more
11Under trade theory there is an inverse relation between volume of trade and population, as larger countries
tend to be more self-su±cient. On the other hand, there is a direct relation between volume of trade and GDP
as it re°ects the size of demand and supply of the market.
10appropriate when analysing the plot for each series (¯gures 1 to 10). Finally, as far as the
speci¯cation of the test equations is concerned, time dummies are always included to control for
common e®ects across cross-sections.
(Insert table 1 here)
The results of the panel unit root tests for each variable used in this paper are shown
in table 1. Since we have annual data with a limited time span, we use one lag to account
for autocorrelation. As we may observe in table 1, in every case the null that every variable
contains a unit root for the series in logs is rejected with the exception of the ¯ve measures of
FDI (in levels, not in shares), aggregated capital stocks, GDP, GDP per capita di®erential and
population. The hypothesis of non-stationarity was not rejected against the alternative that the
population series is stationary, but was rejected against the null of trend-stationary.
To test for the possibility that the variables which were found to be non-stationary are
integrated of second order, I(2), unit root tests on the ¯rst di®erences of the variables were run.
Although not shown here, these tests suggest that all variables are stationary in ¯rst di®erences.
Having ascertained the time series properties of the data, we now select the variables that are
stationary and align the time span pertaining to each variable in order to obtain a balanced panel
for all stationary variables. The result is a panel comprising the share of U.S. FDI portrayed
in the ¯ve measures, transport cost, competition factor, trade barriers index, FDI openness
index, labour productivity, corporate taxes, population, intellectual property rights index and
production and non-production workers, for the period 1990-1996. With this panel we estimated
a share gravity model in order to analyse the determinants of U.S. FDI location. For the non-
stationary variables we constructed a balanced panel comprising aggregated capital stock, GDP
and GDP per capita di®erential for the period 1982-1997, which will be used in section 5 to
analyse the issue of possible cointegration and causality among each GDP variable and FDI as
measured by aggregate capital stock.
4 Estimation of the Share Gravity Model
4.1 The Share Gravity Model
The formulation adopted in most applications of the gravity models to the analysis of trade
and FDI goes back to the contribution of Hua and Porell (1979) and can be summarised by the
generalised version of the classical gravity model, as follows:







where Fijt is the expected interaction °ow between locations i and j per unit of time, ­ is a
predetermined quantity, AGit measures the features of country i that generate the out°ows,
ATjt measures the attractiveness of country j and SFijt is a spatial measure between the two
countries. Hua and Porell (1979) denominate AGit, ATjt, SFijt, as generation, attraction (the
mass terms) and the spatial term, respectively. So, the inverse of the facility, SF¡1
ijt , measures
the separation factor, which in the present context certainly includes transport costs between
country i and j, at time t, but also any trad and foreign investment barriers in the target
destination, j. ®1, ®2 and ®3 are parameters to be estimated.
The classical gravity model applied to the international trade theory uses the \distance-
decay" concept (Fotheringham, 1983, 1984), which may be described as the rate at which the
volume of trade between locations decreases as the distance between them increases. Conversely,
the FDI theory uses the \distance-incentive" concept, or the rate at which the volume of FDI
11°ow increases as the transport costs between economic centres increases, since it will become
preferable to produce locally than to export (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992, Brainard, 1993b,
1997, Markusen and Venables, 1996). Therefore, when modelling international trade °ows we
expect that ®1 > 0, ®2 > 0 and ®3 < 0 whereas for FDI °ows we should obtain ®1 > 0, ®2 > 0
and ®3 > 0.
In spite of its widespread use in international economics, the classical version of the gravity
model arguably contains a fundamental °aw when applied to the empirical analysis of FDI:
it implies that FDI °ows between two countries depend solely on factors pertaining to those
countries. Most crucially it ignores the attractiveness of alternative locations. To overcome
this limitation Mello-Sampayo (2000) proposes the use of the share version of the gravity model
introduced in the human geography literature by Hua and Porell (1979), but virtually ignored
in economic applications. Its main di®erence from the classical version stems from the fact that
a competition factor encompassing the ability of third countries to attract FDI is included as a
dampening factor to FDI °owing to any potential location. Such an alternative speci¯cation of
the gravity model applied to the behaviour of FDI may be given by the following equation:














where ¯0, ¯1, ¯2 and ¯3 are parameters, i stands for country, j for industry, t for time, US for
United States. The variable FUS
ijt denotes United States FDI into industry j of country i at time
t.
Equation (5) gives the sum, weighted by the separation term relative to industry j, of all
other countries' characteristics (except country i) in attracting FDI from the United States.
Equation (5) attempts to capture the gravity of the competing destinations. Otherwise, it can
be seen as a composite index that yields the competition faced by industry j in country i in
attracting United States FDI.
Since the aim of the present study is not to explain the amount in levels of FDI, but rather
the way United States MNEs distribute their foreign activities across di®erent countries, we need
a model of shares rather than levels. That may be accomplished by substituting the parameter
­ in equation (4) by the total FDI out°ow from United States in industry j into all countries










Notice that we have not included the generation variable in equation (6) since this is an
origin-speci¯c model and so variations in the United States' aggressiveness become redundant in
explaining changes in the FDI shares of destination countries12. What is crucial about equation
(6) is the fact that since a country's advantage as a location for FDI is dependent on the weighted
sum of all other countries' attractiveness, the traditional gravity model, according to which a
change in the characteristics of one country would not shift °ows into other countries, misses
the interdependence among FDI °ows. However, in a world of scarce capital resources, the
interdependence of the °ows seems to be a much more plausible theory of investment.
12If the level of °ows instead of shares was to be analysed, the home country's aggressiveness would prove
instrumental in accounting for variations in the interaction °ows.
124.2 The Econometric Model
The following dynamic log-linear model, which we call the benchmark model, explains the share




ijt¡1 + ¯1LTCijt + ¯2LCFijt + ¯3LTRPit + ¯4LFDIOit +





i = 1;2;:::;12; denotes countries;
j = 1;2;:::;14; denotes industries;
t = 2;:::;7; denotes periods (years).
The dependent variable, LFSHijt, is the log of the U.S. FDI into industry j of country i
over the total FDI out°ow from the U.S. into industry j of all countries in the panel at time t.
LTCijt is the log of the transport costs for industry j between the U.S. parent and its foreign
a±liate in country i at time t. LCFijt is the log of the index that yields the competition factor
faced by industry j in country i at time t. LTRPit and LFDIOit are the logs of the survey
measures of protection to trade and openness to FDI in country i at time t, respectively. LLPit
is the log of labour productivity in country i at time t. LCTit is the log of corporate taxes on
pro¯ts, income and capital gains as a percentage of GDP, and LPOPit is the log of population
in country i, at time t.





(Tij ¡ 1) = 1008,
where Tij = T = 7, since we have a balanced panel data. The two-way error component term of
equation (7) is given by:
uijt = ¸t + ´i + 'j + "ijt (8)
where ´i accounts for unobservable country-speci¯c e®ects, 'j accounts for unobservable industry-
speci¯c e®ects and ¸t accounts for time-speci¯c e®ects. The term "ijt is the random disturbance
in the regression, varying across time, country and industry cells. As regards the model of equa-
tion (7), we assume sequential exogeneity of the regressors, which amounts to postulating that
the dynamics of the model are entirely captured by the one-period lagged dependent variable.
Thus, the "ijt can be assumed to be independently distributed across individuals with zero mean.
But arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity across units and time are allowed.
The benchmark model, given by equation (7), will be used primarily to test the validity of
the share gravity model as a relevant empirical framework for FDI. The way we think equation
(7) provides a suitable testing ground for the share gravity model can be seen by grouping the
variables in (7) so as to match the terms of equation (6). In fact, we can think of transport
costs, trade barriers and FDI openness in (7) as accounting for the separation term between
the source and the target locations, in the same way as population, labour productivity and
corporate taxes can be seen as factors determining the attractiveness of the target location. The
remaining two variables in equation (7), competition factor and the lagged dependent variable
account for the competition exerted by alternative destinations and the dynamics of the model,
respectively. Further ahead, we will add to equation (7) the intellectual property rights index
to test the internalisation hypothesis and after the number of production and non-production
workers to fully test the proximity-concentration hypothesis.
In picking the econometric technique to estimate equation (7) we have to carefully consider
the characteristics of this speci¯c panel data. As regards the choice of the estimation procedure,
our econometric problem exhibits two de¯ning features. First, we have a typical short-panel,
since the number of time periods is limited and the number of units large. This implies that
13the ¯xed e®ects least squares model suggested by M¶ aty¶ as (1998) for the estimation of the
gravity model, which explicitly estimates the time and individual e®ects in (8), would result
in a large loss of degrees of freedom and quite possibly in multicollinearity problems, since
we are estimating extra parameters for the individual and time e®ects. Second, the presence
of the lagged dependent variable in the right-hand side of the regression equation means that
the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the unobservable country and industry-speci¯c
e®ects. That is because both LFSHUS
ijt and LFSHUS
ijt¡1 depend on ´i, 'j, which are imbedded
in the error term. This fact rules out the pooled OLS and the random e®ects estimators as both
estimators would come out inconsistent.
The problem of the correlation between LFSHUS
ijt¡1 and ´i and 'j could be overcome by
applying a transformation to the model in equation (7) that would eliminate the unobservable
¯xed country and industry e®ects. There two natural such transformations: the within transfor-








be correlated with ["ijt ¡ "ij:] even if the random disturbances "ijt are not serially correlated,







will be correlated with ["ijt ¡ "ijt¡1] even if the random
disturbances "ijt are not serially correlated, because LFSHijt is correlated with ¹ "ijt+1 by con-
struction. In these two cases, the assumption of strict exogeneity is violated, causing both the
within and ¯rst-di®erences estimators to be inconsistent.
Under these conditions, especially when estimating dynamic models under short-panel data,
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest exploiting the orthogonality conditions between the explana-
tory variables (the lagged dependent variable and the exogenous variables) and the random
term that exists in equation (7) in order to instrument the regressors that are correlated with
the two-way error component term. Following Arellano and Bond (1991) and several other re-
lated contributions thereafter, a GMM estimation procedure is applied to our dynamic panel
data model. The standard GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which elimi-
nates unobserved speci¯c e®ects by applying ¯rst di®erences or orthogonal deviations and taking
lagged levels of the regressors as instruments is not suitable for our panel data because the ¯ve
measures of FDI are found to be highly persistent13. Thus, lagged levels are only weakly corre-
lated with subsequent ¯rst-di®erences and as shown in Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999) in this
particular setting, weak instruments can result in large ¯nite-sample biases and imprecision14. If
the instruments used in the ¯rst-di®erences estimator are weak, then the ¯rst-di®erences GMM
results are expected to be biased downwards, as with the within groups (see Arellano and Bond,
1991, Blundell and Bond, 1998, 1999). Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999) also showed that biases
resulting from using weak instruments could be considerably reduced by incorporating more
informative moment conditions. These moments conditions result from using changes in the
lags of the regressors as instruments for the equations in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995).
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest stacking the moments conditions relative to the equations in
¯rst-di®erences and in levels to form what they call the GMM-system estimator. These authors
employ Monte Carlo simulations to show that the GMM-system estimator brings about a dra-
matic improvement in the small-sample bias and precision relative to the standard (Arellano and
Bond, 1991) estimator, particularly when the dependent variable is highly persistent (though
stationary), which seems to be an essential feature of our data. In view of its superiority in
terms of unbiasedness and e±ciency, we use the GMM-system estimator in all estimations of
13The results of ¯tting a AR(1) to all variables considered is available from the authors upon request.
14Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999) demonstrate that the instruments used in the ¯rst-di®erence GMM estimator
become less informative in two important cases: as the value of the autoregressive parameter tends towards unity
and as the variance of the ¯xed e®ects increases relative to the variance of the random shocks.
14the share gravity model.
In the context of our share gravity model, the precise set of instruments that give rise to
the moments conditions depends on the degree of exogeneity we are prepared to assume for the
regressors other than the lagged dependent variable. As we do not expect all regressors to be
strictly exogenous, we assume sequential exogeneity as we did for the lagged dependent variable.
This leads to moments conditions that imply that the residuals of the estimated equations are
uncorrelated with contemporaneous and past observations of all the regressors. Therefore, the
matrix of instruments is composed of lagged levels of the dependent variable dated t ¡ 2 and
earlier and lagged levels of the remaining regressors dated t¡1 and earlier in the ¯rst di®erence
equations and of lagged ¯rst-di®erences of the dependent variable dated t ¡ 2 with lagged ¯rst-
di®erences of the remaining regressors dated t ¡ 1 as instruments in the levels equations.
4.3 Estimation Results
The results pertaining to the estimation of the benchmark share gravity model in (7) as well
as some extensions to it are reported in tables 2, 3 and 4. In table 2 we report the results
found for each of the ¯ve measures of FDI. Moreover, since the various measures of FDI are
likely to be highly correlated, we used the principal component analysis (PCA) to analyse the
underlying dimensionality of the ¯ve measures. The ¯ve eigenvalues were 4.636, 0.306, 0.034,
0.019 and 0.006. Since the largest eigenvalue accounts for 92.7 per cent of the total variation and
the corresponding eigenvector suggests that all variables have nearly the same weight, we may
conclude that any of the ¯ve measures of FDI may be used to picture the FDI phenomenon,
or that the e®ective dimensionality of the FDI data is one. In other words, the estimation
results should be almost identical for each of the ¯ve measures. A new series, PCV, was created
using the ¯rst principal component. As patent in table 2, the econometric results seem to be
consistent with the PCA predictions. Thus, in tables 3 and 4 we report only the results for the
PCV variable.
In all tables 2, 3 and 4 we report the results for both the one-step and two-step GMM-system
estimators. The one-step estimator uses a weighting matrix that is independent of estimated
parameters, while the (asymptotically) more e±cient two-step estimator uses a weighting matrix
that corresponds to the variance matrix of the estimated residuals of the one-step estimator. In
spite of its asymptotic higher e±ciency relative to the one-step estimator, the two-step estimator
produces downward biased variance estimates in small samples due to the extra variation intro-
duced by the presence of estimated parameters rather than the true ones, resulting in oversized
individual and joint signi¯cance tests. In this context, it has been advocated the use of the one-
step estimator for inference, since this estimator reports a dispersion around the point estimate
that is closer to the asymptotic one in ¯nite samples. In any case, the trade-o® between the
higher asymptotic e±ciency and the downward biasedness of the variance estimates pertaining
to the two-step GMM-system estimator hinges, in a rather complex way, on the speci¯c model in
hand, the number of cross-section and time periods, the speci¯c instruments used, and the num-
ber of moments. Therefore, the choice between the one-step and the two-step GMM estimators
for the analysis of the results is not straightforward.
Along with the estimated coe±cients of the share gravity model and the respective p-values,
we report several speci¯cation tests. The Wald test evaluates the overall signi¯cance of the
model under the null hypothesis that all coe±cients are jointly zero. We also report a ¯rst-order
and second-order autocorrelation tests for the residuals of the equations in ¯rst-di®erences. The
rationale for this is that the presence of serial correlation in the residuals of the original model
(in levels) constitutes evidence that sequential exogeneity of the regressors cannot hold, which in
turn implies the invalidity of moment conditions that rely on the levels (or changes) of lags of the
15dependent variable as instruments, as it is the case with the GMM-system estimator we are using.
Since we are testing for autocorrelation of the residuals in the di®erenced equations, we should
expect to ¯nd ¯rst-order serial correlation but no evidence of second-order autocorrelation if the
model is well speci¯ed, i.e. if our speci¯cation fully captures the dynamics of the underlying
true model15. Finally, we report a Sargan test for the overidentifying restrictions under the null
of the validity of the moment conditions.
In table 2, for both one-step and two-step GMM-system estimators we reject the null of the
Wald test and so accept the overall signi¯cance of the regressors. We fail to reject ¯rst-order
but not second-order autocorrelation of the residuals in the equations in ¯rst-di®erences, which
constitutes evidence in favour of the validity of the assumption of sequential exogeneity. Even
though there is a strong tendency for the Sargan test to over-reject the null hypothesis under
the presence of heteroskedastic errors, the validity of the over-identifying restrictions are not
rejected for TA, KS and PCV. A model with an intercept was estimated and, as expected, the
intercept turned out to be statistically insigni¯cant, since the dependent variable is expressed
in shares, not levels. It turns out that the model in equation (7) seems to be well speci¯ed and
to explain the share of FDI reasonably well. Moreover, the estimated individual coe±cients for
the various measures of FDI were generally found to have the correct sign and to be statistically
signi¯cant (at least for the two-step GMM estimator). Adding to all this the fact that the
competition factor, which is absent from the classical version, has been estimated to have a
detrimental e®ect on the share of FDI, not only vindicates the share gravity model as a suitable
framework for the analysis of the locational determinants of FDI, but is also suggestive of its
superiority over the classical version.
The results of the estimation of equation (7) suggest that the share of FDI exhibits a high
persistence as the coe±cient on the lagged dependent variable was found to be relatively close to
one and quite signi¯cant. As often contended in the literature, this can be regarded as evidence
in favour of the presence of agglomeration e®ects in FDI.
(Insert table 2 here)
The inclusion of an adjacency dummy and of intellectual property rights (IPR) variable
is assessed in the share gravity model by using the PCV measure of FDI (see table 3). The
adjacency dummy takes the value of one for Mexico and Canada and zero otherwise. The e®ects
of adjacency are generally analysed in light of the impact of the geographical proximity on FDI
decisions. However, in the particular case of the U.S., the two adjacent countries form with the
U.S. a trade zone (NAFTA), which leads us also to consider the e®ects of regional integration
on FDI when looking at the estimated e®ects of adjacency.
According to the \distance-incentive" concept, which assumes higher relevance for horizontal
FDI, the adjacency parameter estimate should be negative as low transport costs should render
exporting more advantageous than FDI. However, adjacency also exerts some positive e®ects
on the potential to attract FDI, as it may encourage local production destined to be exported
back to the parent ¯rm's home market or MNEs' vertical integration across borders (Brainard,
1993a) and also reduce the cost of supervision of foreign a±liates (Ethier and Horn, 1990, Lipsey,
1999, 2000). The results are presented in table 3. It appears that, if anything, adjacency plays
an overall negative role in the location of FDI (see columns PCV(2) for both the one-step and
two-step estimators in table 3). The lack of statistical signi¯cance of the estimated coe±cient
on adjacency might be re°ecting the fact that we would expect the FDI °owing to Mexico
to be predominantly of the vertical type and that °owing to Canada to be predominantly
of the horizontal type. Therefore, since these two types of FDI are a®ected by distance in
15If a series ut are iid it can be easily shown that corr(¢ut;¢ut¡1) = ¡0:5 and corr(¢ut;¢ut¡2) = 0.
16opposite ways, the positive e®ect of adjacency pertaining to Mexico might be cancelling out the
negative e®ect pertaining to Canada. These con°icting e®ects will further interact with the also
potentially contradictory e®ects of NAFTA on American FDI (see section 1). Overall, the lack
of a discernible impact of adjacency on U.S. FDI is perfectly compatible with the predictions of
the FDI theory.
The columns PCV(3) for both the one-step and two-step estimators in table 3 show the results
of the share gravity model with the inclusion of the IPR variable. The estimated coe±cient of
IPR measures how keen MNEs are in protecting their proprietary advantages. The coe±cient
on IPR appears positive as expected, though not signi¯cant under the one-step estimator.
This implies that MNEs will, ceteris paribus, invest in the locations that better guarantee that
their know-how cannot be improperly exploited by local competitors, which conforms with the
\internalisation" hypothesis.
(Insert table 3 here)
Finally, we test the \proximity-concentration" hypothesis using the share gravity model.
Since we use shares of FDI allocated to each country in the panel, we are controlling for the
determinants of trade °ows that are common to all alternative locations in the panel thereby
mitigating the potential problems associated with the joint determinacy of exports and FDI. The
results of including the scale-economies variables in the original share gravity model (equation
7) are reported in the columns PCV(1) for both the one-step and two-step estimators in table
4. All the coe±cients have the predicted sign. Speci¯cally, in regard to the scale variables,
the coe±cient on production workers (PW) is negative and signi¯cant at 10 percent under
the two-step estimator but not signi¯cant under the one-step estimator. The non-production
workers' (NPW) coe±cient is positive and signi¯cant. Hence, scale economies at the plant level,
by which the concentration of production lowers unit costs, a®ect negatively the share of FDI
allocated to each country in the panel. On the other hand, scale economies at the corporate level,
which imply that the ¯rm has an input that can be spread among any number of factories with
undiminished value, a®ects positively the share of FDI. This combined with the positive e®ect
of transport costs, trade barriers and of market size, indicates that the share of FDI allocated
to each country in the panel is an increasing function of proximity advantages but decreasing in
the advantages from concentrating production in one location.
Comparing these results with the ones of the column PCV(1) of the two-step estimator dis-
played in table 3, the elasticities given by the coe±cients of CF and FDIO are signi¯cantly higher
under the \proximity-concentration" hypothesis. Thus, the weight of competition of potential
competing countries and the host market investment climate comes stronger in equations where
the ¯rm is assumed to be confronted with the trade-o® between proximity to consumers and
concentration of production. In sum, the \proximity-concentration" hypothesis is not rejected
when explaining the share of FDI allocated to each country in the panel. All relevant variables
appear with the correct sign, namely corporate scale economies and production scale economies
are positive and negatively, respectively, related to the share allocated to a speci¯c location.
Again adjacency and IPR have the predicted signs.
(Insert table 4 here)
5 Long Run Relation, Short Run Dynamics and Causality Be-
tween Output and FDI
In this section we look at the relation between aggregate FDI as measured by aggregate capital
stocks (AKS) and output. Throughout this section we drop the industry observational category.
17In this way, our data set collapses into a panel of countries from 1982 to 1997. Two di®erent
hypotheses concerning the determinants of FDI are tested. The ¯rst is that the host market
size, measured by GDP, exerts an important in°uence on FDI location. In particular, we would
expect a positive relation between GDP and FDI, since the higher the income of the host country
the more demand for certain goods has gone potentially unful¯lled and so a local presence may
be required. Moreover, we may also have the \home market e®ect", by which in the presence of
transport costs and economies of scale, larger markets attract ¯rms to produce to the internal
market and export to smaller countries (Krugman, 1980, Helpman and Krugman, 1985).
The second hypothesis tests whether per capita income di®erential (GDPDIF) re°ects de-
mand or supply determinants of FDI. On the one hand, the Linder hypothesis implies that
countries with similar per capita income will tend to enjoy each others' di®erentiated products.
Thus, a negative relation between GDPDIF and U.S. FDI is expected, since the richer a coun-
try is, the likelier are U.S. MNEs to ¯nd a market for their (di®erentiated) products. Therefore,
an estimated negative relation between GDPDIF and FDI constitutes evidence of per capita
income di®erentials re°ecting demand determinants of FDI. On the other hand, to the extent
that per capita income di®erential constitute a reasonable proxy for capital-labour ratios or
factor-proportions di®erences as assumed in Bergstrand (1989), Bergstrand (1990), Hummels
and Levinsohn (1995), Brainard (1997), the factor-proportions hypothesis predicts a positive
relation between GDPDIF and FDI, since MNEs tend to locate their activities in order to
take advantage of di®erent factor costs stemming from factor-proportions di®erences.
Given that FDI, GDP and GDPDIF have all been found to contain a unit root in x3:6,
we conduct a cointegration-type analysis in order to disclose not only the long run co-properties
of the data, but also their dynamic behaviour and causality. Since at this stage we are only
interested in testing the above mentioned hypotheses, we use a bivariate framework that besides
being simpler to handle allows to test the long-run direct e®ect of GDP and income di®erential
on FDI as well as the e®ect of FDI on long-run economic growth and convergence without
specifying a full structural model.
We test for cointegration using a panel data equivalent to the single equation methodology.
The main motivation for using the panel data cointegration test is to increase the power of the
test by increasing the sample size that results from pooling the data from di®erent cross section
units. This procedure has been often claimed in the literature to be superior to the alternative
of widening the span of the time series because problems associated with structural changes are
likely to arise in long time series16.
We estimate the cointegration relationships and the error-correction mechanism (ECM) equa-
tions separately for each country, and test hypotheses regarding panel-average e®ects by averag-
ing only the relevant parameters across countries. The advantage of this method is that instead
of assuming parameters to be common across countries, which might lead to bias and possible
inconsistency when estimating the panel-average e®ects (Pesaran and Smith, 1995), we allow
for heterogeneity among the key parameters across countries. Thus, we are also able to analyse
and compare individual country results.
5.1 Panel Data Cointegration Tests
To test for cointegration we can use the panel data equivalent to the Engle and Granger (1987)
two-step procedure, which basically consists of ¯rstly estimating a cointegrating regression and
secondly testing for the presence of unit roots in the cointegration regression's residuals. Thus,
the null-hypothesis is in fact a hypothesis of no-cointegration.
16However, as remarked in Maddala and Kim (1998), it is not clear that structural change is less problematic
than the cross-sectional heterogeneity associated with panel data.
18Given the possibility of reverse causality between the variables we use Pedroni (2003) panel
cointegration technique, which is robust to causality running in both directions and allows
for both heterogeneous cointegrating vectors and short-run dynamics across countries. The
cointegration equations for each of the mentioned hypotheses are given by:
FDIUS
it = ®i + bt + ¯iGDPit + eit (¯rst hypothesis) (9)
FDIUS
it = ®i + bt + ¯iGDPDIFit + eit (second hypothesis) (10)
where all variables are in logs. The term eit represents a stationary error term. In this section
the subscript i indexes countries for the hypotheses tested (i = 1;:::;N). Notice that equations
(9) and (10) can allow for ¯xed e®ects (®i), time-speci¯c e®ects (bt)17, and the slope of the
cointegrating relationship (¯i) to vary across countries.
Running a unit root test on the residuals retrieved from equations (9) and (10), the null-
hypothesis of no-cointegration is tested. Since such residuals consist of a panel, we use as before
the Im et al. (2003) ADF unit root t-bar tests. However, since we are testing residuals from
an estimated relationship (^ eit) rather than a true relationship (eit), in order to construct the
test statistic from the average of all countries' ADF t-statistics we employ the adjustment terms
provided by Pedroni (1999, 2003) rather than the ones in Im et al. (2003).
In table 5 we report the average over countries of the ADF t-test calculated from the residuals
from equations (9) and (10) with a lag length of up to 3 years. As the results make clear, we
reject the null of no-cointegration for each of the two hypotheses. Consequently, we may assume
that there is cointegration between and FDIUS and GDP, and between FDIUS and GDPDIF.
(Insert table 5 here)
5.2 Error-Correction and Short-Run Dynamics
Given the evidence in favour of cointegration between FDIUS and both GDP and GDPDIF,
we proceed with the estimation of both long{run relationships and ECMs, for which we need to
choose a procedure among the available in the literature.
The Engle-Granger two-step procedure has been criticised on the grounds of small-sample
bias present in the OLS estimation of the cointegration equation. This bias carries over to the
estimates of the short-run parameters obtained in the ECM equations. Another issue is that
of normalisation. The results from the single equation methods depend on what variable is
used for normalisation of the cointegrating relationship18, while with the Johansen (1988, 1991)
maximum likelihood procedure the problem of normalisation does not appear.
Thus, in estimating the error-correction model we follow a two-step procedure. The ¯rst step
consists of demeaning the data relative to the panel mean for each period to accommodate the
presence of common time e®ects19, and then use the Johansen procedure to estimate equation
(9) and (10) for each cross-section individually20. With the normalised estimated coe±cients
17In this context, the time e®ects are aimed at capturing any secular movements in FDI °ows and/or business
cycle °uctuations.
18Ng and Perron (1997) show that the least squares estimator can have poor ¯nite sample properties when
normalised in one direction but can be well-behaved when normalised in the other. Since the single equation
method is associated with least squares estimation, it su®ers from normalisation problems.








it , taken over the N
countries in the panel. Note that we work with the demeaned data throughout this section.
20The selection of the lag length (k), for the estimation of the cointegrating vector under the Johansen method-
ology, consists of choosing the value of k that minimises ¯rst, the log-likelihood and then the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC). However, note that the AIC, although consistent, is known to under¯t in small samples.
19we are able to construct the disequilibrium term, ^ eit = FDIUS
it ¡ ^ ®i ¡ ^ bt ¡ ^ ¯iXit, where Xit
may denote GDPit or GDPDIFit depending on the hypothesis under analysis. In the second
step, we use the estimated disequilibrium term, ^ eit, to estimate the ECM independently for each
country in the panel through OLS:
¢FDIUS
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Á22ij¢Xi;t¡j + "2it (12)
The variable ^ eit represents deviations from the long-run equilibrium and the ECM estimates
how these disequilibria propel the cointegrating variables to adjust in order to keep the long-
run equilibrium relationship unaltered. In the spirit of the Granger representation theorem, if
FDIUS and X are cointegrated then ¸1i and ¸2i cannot both be zero. Finally, note that k is
chosen by a \general-to-speci¯c" procedure21.
To analyse the adjustments to deviations from equilibrium and also the short-run tran-
sitional dynamics implicit in each of the hypotheses being tested we estimate equation (11)
and analyse the signi¯cance and sign of the elements of the vectors: ¸1 = [¸11;¸12;:::;¸1N];
Á11 = [Á111;Á112;:::;Á11N]; Á12 = [Á121;Á122;:::;Á12N].
Tables 6 and 7 present the results for equation (11) under the ¯rst and second hypothesis,
respectively. In table 6, it is clear that all countries converge to the long{run equilibrium with
the exception of Philippines, although the elements of the vector ¸1 corresponding to Canada,
France, Germany and Spain are not signi¯cant at 10 percent signi¯cance level. Moreover, a
test of the joint hypothesis that the adjustment parameter ¸1 is zero in every country is also
reported in table 6. This Likelihood ratio (LR) test provides strong evidence against the long{
run e®ect being uniformly zero among all countries, and since it clearly rejects the null of no
long{run e®ect at the 1 percent signi¯cance level in each case, it corroborates the Engle-Granger
cointegration test ran previously.
(Insert table 6 here)
According to the ¯rst hypothesis, by which positive shocks to market size have a persistent,
positive impact on FDIUS
it , we expect that
k P
j=1
Á12 > 0 for each i. The U.K. and Italy seem
to contradict the market size (¯rst) hypothesis as, though not signi¯cant, the relevant Á12
coe±cients are negative for the U.K. and Italy. For the remaining countries, the \market size"
hypothesis holds.
Now, by the second hypothesis, shocks to GDPDIF may have a persistent, positive impact
on FDIUS if the factor-proportions hypothesis prevail, but may as well have a persistent, neg-




Á12 > 0 but under the Linder hypothesis we expect
k P
j=1
Á12 < 0. The
evidence presented in table 7 on the relative relevance of the two hypothesis in explaining FDI
coming from the estimates of the Á12 coe±cients in equation (11) is rather mixed. Only for
Italy were we able to ¯nd a negative and signi¯cant at 10 percent level estimates on the relevant
21Two di®erent procedures are employed and then combined: one is to pick the smallest k that gives residuals
that pass the LM-test for serial correlation at 5 percent signi¯cance level, the other consist of choosing the value
of k that minimises the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).
20Á12 coe±cients. On the other hand, we found a positive and signi¯cant estimate of the relevant
Á12 coe±cients for Mexico and Thailand. Though not very robust, these results are compatible
with the standard predictions of the modern FDI literature that demand determinants are more
relevant for FDI among developed countries, and supply determinants for FDI more important
for developing countries.
(Insert table 7 here)
5.3 Testing for Granger-Causality
So far we have established that FDIUS is cointegrated with X. These hypotheses would then
presuppose that Granger-causality would run from the relevant real output variable to FDI,
since those hypotheses are aimed at explaining the determinants of FDIUS location. However,
this does not preclude the existence of reverse causality, that is, it would be interesting to
test whether GDP, GDPDIF Granger causes FDIUS, but also if FDIUS Granger causes the
income variables.
(Insert tables 8 and 9 here)
The results of the individual Granger-causality tests are reported in tables 8 and 9. In those
tables it is clear that Granger-causality between FDIUS and the output variables has been
estimated to be bi-directional for some countries, unidirectional for some other, and in some
instances the non-causality hypothesis has simply not been rejected. According to Canning and
Pedroni (1999) this type of mixed results can be given two alternative interpretations. One
is that causality might occur in some countries but not in others. Another interpretation is
purely statistical and follows from the inevitable sampling variation associated with any testing
procedure. In fact, when testing the null of non-causality, say at the 10 percent signi¯cance level,
we would be prepared to reject the null for 10 percent of the countries in a situation in which
the null is true. In this context, a number of rejections well above 10 percent of the cases can be
taken as evidence against the hypothesis that there is no causality in every country. Therefore,
in order to complement the causality tests run individually for each country, in table 10 we
report the percentage of countries that reject the F-test for the hypothesis of non-causality at
the 10 percent signi¯cance level. Using this criterion, we have evidence in favour of causality
running in both directions when the income variable used is GDP, since we ¯nd rejections of
non-causality in more than 10 percent of countries (see table 10)22. However, when we use
GDPDIF we fail to reject reject that GDPDIF does not Granger-cause FDIUS.
(Insert table 10 here)
We also test the joint hypothesis of non-causality in all countries. This is given by a likelihood
ratio test of the hypothesis that all relevant parameters are jointly zero in every country. Under
the null hypothesis of non-causality the test statistic is established as a Chi-square with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed. Again, evidence supports two-way
causality between FDI and the GDP variables. The fact that non-causality is rejected in a
signi¯cant number of countries supports the idea that the results for the likelihood ratio (LR)
test of non-causality in all countries are not being driven by a small number of extreme estimates
22Under the null hypothesis of a parameter value of zero in every country, in the present case the number of
countries rejecting at the 10% signi¯cance level has a Binomial distribution with mean 1.2 and variance 1.08.
Note that for a large sample (N large) we could approximate to a Normal distribution with mean 10 (measured
in percentage of rejections of the null) and standard deviation 30N
¡1=2 (see e.g. Freund, 1992).
21in a few countries. However, we ¯nd evidence that extreme estimates may be in°uencing the
value of the LR test-statistic in the case of Granger-causality running from GDPDIF to FDIUS,
since only Italy and Malaysia support causality between these two variables. If that is the case,
then it implies that even though these two variables are cointegrated, it is GDPDIF that adjusts
in the short run to disequilibrium shocks and variations in FDI, not the other way round.
The bi-directional causality detected from FDIUS to GDP supports the by now standard
argument that FDI has the potential to promote economic development of the host country.
Sidestepping the controversial issue of whether FDI produces a net contribution to a country's
capital formation, it nevertheless entails the transfer of technology, new ideas, knowledge (on
markets and on products) and human skills to the host country23. In this sense, FDI is nowadays
reckoned as \good news" by countries whose policies (e.g. income tax, trade policies, and
subsidies to foreign ¯rms) clearly re°ect the increased concern of governments towards attracting
FDI in°ows. In what concerns the sign of the e®ect of past realisations of FDIUS on GDP,
the results of the estimation of equation (12) depicted in table 11 show that FDI has a positive
impact on GDP growth for all countries in the panel but the Philippines.
(Insert table 11 here)
The bottom-left quadrant of table 10 indicates that GDPDIF is Granger caused by FDIUS,
implying that past realisations of FDIUS contributes to the present level of the GDP per capita
di®erential of the countries in the panel. Having already established that FDI has a positive
impact on GDP growth, we must test whether that impact is strong enough to promote absolute
or conditional convergence across countries24 (de Mello, 1997). Since we have a mixed panel of
countries re°ecting di®erentiated stages of development, we expect FDI to a®ect the countries'
steady states di®erently. In particular, we are interested in knowing whether the estimated
coe±cient of lagged values of FDIUS
it on GDPDIFit (the Á21 coe±cients) in the developing
countries are negative, as it would imply that per capita income di®erentials tend to disappear
over time. This is precisely the overall pattern of results described in table 12, in which it is clear
that for all developing countries (except for Mexico and Thailand), plus Italy and U.K., FDI
concurs to economic convergence since the estimated Á21's are negative for this set of countries.
(Insert table 12 here)
5.4 Testing for Long run E®ects of FDI on Output Growth and Convergence
The above discussed Granger-causality tests results are aimed at ascertaining the feedbacks
existing between FDIUS and GDP and FDIUS and GDPDIF . However, the causality de-
tected may be temporary due for example to the multiplier e®ects of FDI, so that innovations to
FDIUS may a®ect GDP and GDPDIF in the short-run but eventually die out as the system
converges towards the long-run. Therefore, it would be important to investigate whether FDI
a®ects output in the long-run. For that purpose, since the variables are cointegrated, we use
a result demonstrated in Canning and Pedroni (1999) that in our case would read: "provided
that some conditions in the long-run behaviour of GDP (GDPDIF) hold25, the coe±cient ¸2
in equation (12) is equal to zero if, and only if, innovations to FDIUS have no long-run e®ect
on GDP (GDPDIF)".
23For a survey on the potential bene¯ts of inward FDI, see Blomstrom and Kokko (1996).
24Under the neoclassical growth theory, the conditional convergence holds that low income countries will tend
to grow faster than the rich ones, leading to a progressive reduction in the income di®erential. On the other hand,
the absolute convergence hypothesis states that economies will have the same speed of convergence.
25These conditions follow from the moving average representation of the stationary vector ¢Zt =
(¢FDIt;¢Xt)
0 = F(L)"t, where X denotes either GDP or GDPDIF and "t = ("1t;"2t) is a vector of innovations.
22It turns out that by simply testing the signi¯cance of the coe±cients ¸2i in the regression
(12) we are testing for long-run causality from FDIUS to GDP or from FDIUS to GDPDIF
separately from any short-run causal e®ect. We test the joint null-hypothesis H0 : ¸2i = 0
for all i. This again is a likelihood-ratio test, whose test statistic under the null hypothesis is
distributed as a Chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions, in this
case the number of countries in the panel.
The outcome of the tests displayed in tables 11 and 12 show unequivocally that the ¸2i are
statistically signi¯cant, meaning that there must be long-run causality running from FDIUS to
GDP and equally from FDIUS to GDPDIF.
6 Conclusion
The e®ect of several factors on the location of FDI is tested under the share gravity model using
panel data on U.S. MNEs disaggregated at the industry level. The share of U.S. FDI, portrayed
by ¯ve di®erent measures, is increasing in lagged FDI shares, transport costs, trade barriers,
FDI openness, labour productivity and population, and decreasing in competition posed by other
countries and corporate taxes. This evidence suggests that country-speci¯c locational factors
are very important determinants of the U.S. FDI. These results combined with the fact that the
factor capturing the gravity of the competing destinations emerges very signi¯cant and with the
correct sign across the di®erent measures of FDI vindicates the use of the share formulation of
the gravity model to the analysis of the location of MNEs' activities.
The share of U.S. FDI is also increasing in the level of protection of intellectual property
rights (IPR) in the host country. Thus, when there are intellectual property advantages, as as-
sumed by the imperfect competition models of multinationals, which are easily transferred across
borders, MNEs will choose the countries that better protect those advantages. The \proximity-
concentration" hypothesis is not rejected when explaining the share of FDI allocated to each
country in the panel. All relevant variables appear with the correct sign, namely corporate scale
economies and production scale economies are respectively, positive and negatively related to
the share allocated to a speci¯c location.
The fact that the variables, aggregated capital stocks, GDP and per capita income di®erential
have been found to contain a unit root implies that the impact of each of these variables on
FDI has to be evaluated using econometric techniques suitable for non-stationary data. The
overall results suggest that GDP has a positive impact on FDI, thereby lending support to the
\market size" hypothesis. The results provide mixed evidence on whether per capita income
di®erential re°ects demand or supply determinants of FDI. By rejecting that per capita income
di®erential helps forecast present values of FDI, we could not claim that our results support
the pure \factor-proportions" explanation for FDI, even though we found evidence that income
per capita di®erential a®ects the long-run growth of FDI. Further, causality tests suggest that
FDI plays a positive role on economic growth and on narrowing the gap between developed and
developing countries.





represent the matrix of long run responses of the levels Zt to realisations of
"t. The condition according to which the proposition outlined in the test holds is that F(1)22 > 0, which means
that innovations to the income variables X have a permanent impact on the levels of X. In turn, this implies
that the income variables contain a unit root, which conforms with the results of our unit root tests for these
variables. For the proof see the mathematical appendix of Canning and Pedroni (1999).
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27Appendix
A List of Industries
I1 - All industries
I2 - Petroleum I10 - Other manufacturing
Oil and gas extraction Tobacco products
Crude petroleum extraction (no re¯ning) and natural gas Textile products and apparel
Oil and gas ¯eld services Lumber, wood, furniture, and ¯xtures
Petroleum and coal products Paper and allied products
Integrated petroleum re¯ning and extraction Printing and publishing
Petroleum re¯ning without extraction Rubber products
Petroleum and coal products, nec Miscellaneous plastics products
Petroleum wholesale trade Glass products
Other Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic mineral products
Instruments and related products
I3 - Manufacturing Other
I4 - Food and kindred products I11 - Wholesale trade
Grain mill and bakery products Durable goods
Beverages Nondurable goods
Other
I12 - Finance (except banking) ,
insurance, and real estate
I5 - Chemicals and allied products Finance, except banking
Industrial chemicals and synthetics Insurance
Drugs Real estate
Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods Holding companies
Agricultural chemicals
Chemical products, nec I13 - Services
Hotels and other lodging places
I6 - Primary and fabricated metals Business services
Primary metal industries Advertising
Ferrous Equipment rental (ex automotive and computers)
Nonferrous Computer and data processing services
Fabricated metal products Business services, nec
Automotive rental and leasing
I7 - Machinery, except electrical Motion pictures, including television tape and ¯lm
Farm and garden machinery Health services
Construction, mining, and materials handling machinery Engineering, architectural, and surveying services
O±ce and computing machines Management and public relations services
Other Other
I8 - Electric and electronic equipment I14 - Other industries
Household appliances Agriculture, forestry, and ¯shing
Radio, television, and communication equipment Mining
Electronic components and accessories Metal mining
Electrical machinery, nec Nonmetallic minerals
Construction
I9 - Transport equipment Transport
Motor vehicles and equipment Communication and public utilities
Other Retail trade
28B Transport Costs
Transport costs by Country
Country 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
Canada 0.017 0.019 0.022 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.02
France 0.049 0.045 0.040 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.03
Germany 0.055 0.054 0.050 0.040 0.051 0.053 0.063 0.054 0.037 0.05
Italy 0.043 0.057 0.064 0.052 0.066 0.069 0.070 0.052 0.039 0.06
Netherlands 0.058 0.059 0.051 0.048 0.053 0.058 0.059 0.056 0.054 0.06
Spain 0.040 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.049 0.044 0.045 0.031 0.036 0.04
United Kingdom 0.050 0.055 0.053 0.047 0.039 0.043 0.041 0.044 0.045 0.04
Mexico 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.01
Indonesia 0.056 0.050 0.036 0.037 0.028 0.033 0.012 0.019 0.022 0.02
Malaysia 0.047 0.037 0.034 0.030 0.021 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.020 0.02
Philippines 0.122 0.107 0.103 0.115 0.107 0.085 0.082 0.051 0.037 0.07
Thailand 0.067 0.052 0.043 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.030 0.024 0.018 0.03
Average 0.04
Note: Transport costs as a percentage of total value of export shipment.
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Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests
Variables in Log-Levels Period N Adjustment Factors Average Group Test
Mean Variance ADF Statistic
Total assets 1988-98 168 -2.172 1.354 -2.18 -0.04
Total Assets All Countriesy 1988-98 14 -2.172 1.354 -1.90 0.88
Capital Stocksy 1988-98 168 -2.172 1.354 -2.17 0.08
Capital Stocks All Countriesy 1988-98 14 -2.172 1.354 -2.09 0.26
Total Salesy 1988-98 168 -2.172 1.354 -2.01 1.84
Total Sales All Countriesy 1988-98 14 -2.172 1.354 -1.98 0.61
Number of Employeesy 1988-98 168 -2.172 1.354 -2.11 0.74
Number of Employees All Countriesy 1988-98 14 -2.172 1.354 -1.83 1.09
Employment Compensationy 1988-98 168 -2.172 1.354 -2.06 1.28
Employment Compensation All Countriesy 1988-98 14 -2.172 1.354 -2.10 0.23
Share Total assets 1988-98 168 -1.491 1.206 -1.79 -3.52***
Share Capital Stocks 1988-98 168 -1.491 1.206 -1.74 -2.91***
Share Total Sales 1988-98 168 -1.491 1.206 -1.84 -4.07***
Share Number of Employees 1988-98 168 -1.491 1.206 -1.88 -4.54***
Share Employment Compensation 1988-98 168 -1.491 1.206 -1.96 -5.58***
Transport Costs 1988-96 168 -1.485 1.304 -2.36 -9.95***
Competition Factor 1988-96 168 -1.485 1.304 -1.68 -2.26***
Trade Protection 1990-97 12 -1.482 1.353 -2.62 -3.39***
FDI Openness 1990-97 12 -1.482 1.353 -2.89 -4.19***
Labour Productivity 1990-97 12 -1.482 1.353 -2.22 -2.20**
Corporate Taxes 1989-96 12 -1.482 1.353 -2.41 -2.78***
Intellectual Property Rights 1990-97 12 -1.482 1.353 -2.35 -2.59***
Population 1982-97 12 -2.170 0.935 -0.82 2.37
De-trended Population 1982-97 12 -1.506 0.999 -2.55 -3.60***
Production Workers 1988-97 14 -1.488 1.255 -2.50 -3.38***
Non-production Workers 1988-97 14 -2.170 1.056 -3.96 -5.54***
Aggregated Capital Stocks y 1982-98 12 -2.170 0.912 -1.82 1.26
GDPy 1982-97 12 -2.170 0.935 -2.59 -1.49
Di®erential GDP per Capita 1982-97 12 -1.506 0.999 -1.05 1.57
a) The tests statistics are distributed as N(0;1) under the null of non-stationary. The statistics are constructed using small sample
adjustment factors from Im et al. (2003).
y Includes a trend.
* Rejects the null at the 10% level.
** Rejects the null at the 5% level.
*** Rejects the null at the 1% level.
34Table 2: Benchmark Share Gravity Model
1-Step System-GMM Estimator
TA KS SL EC EM PCV
Dependent Variable Lag 1 0.703 0.673 0.773 0.773 0.779 0.819
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Transport Costs (TC) 0.123 0.291 0.093 0.102 0.095 0.156
(0.071) (0.020) (0.089) (0.082) (0.066) (0.088)
Competition Factor (CF) -0.237 -0.558 -0.185 -0.214 -0.187 -0.293
(0.088) (0.021) (0.089) (0.084) (0.081) (0.098)
Trade Barriers (TRP) 0.509 1.140 0.144 0.355 0.219 0.601
(0.263) (0.025) (0.608) (0.217) (0.654) (0.306)
FDI Openness (FDIO) 0.732 1.251 0.515 0.597 0.213 0.861
(0.352) (0.320) (0.367) (0.309) (0.758) (0.492)
Labour Productivity (LP) 0.016 0.028 -0.017 0.017 -0.029 0.057
(0.877) (0.916) (0.882) (0.862) (0.718) (0.708)
Corporate taxes (CT) -0.051 0.127 -0.056 -0.076 -0.025 -0.008
(0.858) (0.777) (0.848) (0.693) (0.859) (0.988)
Population (POP) 3.816 1.775 1.267 1.990 1.003 2.103
(0.064) (0.612) (0.528) (0.256) (0.614) (0.516)
Wald Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FOSC Test 0.029 0.036 0.054 0.057 0.042 0.076
SOSC Test 0.827 0.394 0.351 0.309 0.339 0.424
2-Step System-GMM Estimator
TA KS SL EC EM PCV
Dependent Variable Lag 1 0.699 0.773 0.769 0.770 0.783 0.827
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Transport Costs (TC) 0.127 0.142 0.100 0.105 0.093 0.146
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Competition Factor (CF) -0.203 -0.221 -0.193 -0.196 -0.156 -0.247
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade Barriers (TRP) 0.103 0.301 0.131 0.191 0.128 0.225
(0.138) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
FDI Openness (FDIO) 0.303 0.315 0.269 0.270 0.254 0.317
(0.030) (0.413) (0.008) (0.026) (0.006) (0.085)
Labour Productivity (LP) 0.032 0.012 0.023 0.049 -0.057 0.064
(0.232) (0.838) (0.193) (0.020) (0.004) (0.066)
Corporate taxes (CT) -0.043 -0.013 -0.028 -0.091 -0.064 -0.074
(0.448) (0.895) (0.464) (0.023) (0.155) (0.339)
Population (POP) 2.653 2.842 1.543 0.941 0.629 3.065
(0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.099) (0.218) (0.000)
Wald Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FOSC Test 0.063 0.015 0.079 0.077 0.066 0.062
SOSC Test 0.868 0.360 0.381 0.340 0.357 0.401
Sargan Test (ST) 0.084 0.817 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.060
The benchmark model is estimated for all six measures of FDI: Total assets (TA), capital stocks (KS), total sales
(SL), employment compensation (EC), number of employees (EM), ¯rst principal component (PCV). P-values
corresponding to asymptotic standard errors robust to general heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.
The Wald, the Sargan, the First Order Serial Correlation (FOSC) and Second Order Serial Correlation (SOSC)
tests are asymptotically robust to general heteroskedasticity (p-values reported). The number of observations
for all the estimated equations under the benchmark model is 1008.
35Table 3: Benchmark Model with Adjacency & IPR
1-Step System-GMM 2-Step System-GMM
PCV(1) PCV(2) PCV(3) PCV(1) PCV(2) PCV(3)
Dependent Variable Lag 1 0.819 0.838 0.831 0.827 0.842 0.835
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Transport Costs (TC) 0.156 0.119 0.122 0.146 0.112 0.113
(0.088) (0.030) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Competition Factor (CF) -0.293 -0.176 -0.271 -0.247 -0.153 -0.200
(0.098) (0.052) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade Barriers (TRP) 0.601 0.031 0.205 0.225 0.028 0.092
(0.306) (0.894) (0.557) (0.002) (0.424) (0.039)
FDI Openness (FDIO) 0.861 0.313 0.296 0.317 0.402 0.513
(0.492) (0.484) (0.783) (0.085) (0.000) (0.000)
Labour Productivity (LP) 0.057 0.043 -0.072 0.064 0.072 0.028
(0.708) (0.838) (0.714) (0.066) (0.008) (0.354)
Corporate taxes (CT) -0.008 -0.179 -0.070 -0.074 -0.023 -0.027
(0.988) (0.474) (0.793) (0.339) (0.647) (0.640)
Population (POP) 2.103 0.426 2.522 3.065 2.792 3.801
(0.516) (0.870) (0.360) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Adjacency-dummy (ADJ) - -0.277 - - -0.070 -
- (0.324) - - (0.477)
Int. Property Rights (IPR) - - 1.011 - - 0.244
- - (0.420) - - (0.082)
Wald Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FOSC Test 0.076 0.072 0.063 0.062 0.068 0.066
SOSC Test 0.424 0.412 0.399 0.401 0.404 0.401
Sargan Test - - - 0.060 0.069 0.038
The results reported for this extended model refer to the estimation with the ¯rst principal component (PCV) measure of FDI.
P-values corresponding to asymptotic standard errors robust to general heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. The Wald,
the Sargan, the First Order Serial Correlation (FOSC) and Second Order Serial Correlation (SOSC) tests are asymptotically robust
to general heteroskedasticity (p-values reported). The number of observations for all the estimated equations this extended version
of the benchmark model is 1008.
36Table 4: Share Gravity Model Under the Proximity-Concentration Hypothesis
1-Step System-GMM 2-Step System-GMM
PCV(1) PCV(2) PCV(3) PCV(1) PCV(2) PCV(3)
Dependent Variable Lag 1 0.797 0.812 0.808 0.800 0.813 0.811
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Transport Costs (TC) 0.165 0.149 0.155 0.159 0.149 0.150
(0.067) (0.002) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Competition Factor (CF) -0.385 -0.348 -0.369 -0.349 -0.321 -0.320
(0.067) (0.003) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade Barriers (TRP) 0.192 0.127 0.053 0.121 0.119 0.078
(0.711) (0.506) (0.880) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016)
FDI Openness (FDIO) 0.845 0.645 0.296 0.756 0.744 0.516
(0.363) (0.255) (0.811) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Labour Productivity (LP) 0.095 0.002 0.010 0.088 0.018 0.037
(0.546) (0.993) (0.956) (0.000) (0.458) (0.208)
Corporate taxes (CT) -0.081 -0.208 -0.236 -0.068 -0.087 -0.120
(0.775) (0.519) (0.259) (0.147) (0.111) (0.014)
Population (POP) 1.003 3.962 -1.542 2.275 4.950 1.489
(0.771) (0.343) (0.676) (0.000) (0.000) (0.111)
Production Worker (PW) -0.125 -0.093 -0.146 -0.106 -0.071 -0.094
(0.408) (0.448) (0.274) (0.089) (0.257) (0.153)
Non-Production Worker (NPW) 0.379 0.316 0.411 0.332 0.273 0.306
(0.212) (0.110) (0.135) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Adjacency-dummy (ADJ) - -0.139 - - -0.122 -
- (0.904) - - (0.331) -
Int. Property Rights (IPR) - - 0.372 - - 0.131
- - (0.797) - - (0.357)
Wald Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FOSC Test 0.047 0.062 0.050 0.066 0.068 0.068
SOSC Test 0.406 0.416 0.400 0.419 0.417 0.416
Sargan Test - - - 0.004 0.001 0.020
The results reported for this extended model refer to the estimation with the ¯rst principal component (PCV) measure of FDI. P-values
corresponding to asymptotic standard errors robust to general heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. The Wald, the Sargan, the First
Order Serial Correlation (FOSC) and Second Order Serial Correlation (SOSC) tests are asymptotically robust to general heteroskedasticity
(p-values reported). The number of observations for all the estimated equations under this extended version of the benchmark model is 1008.
37Table 5: Panel Cointegration Tests
Average Test
Period Countries ADF Statistic
FDI and GDP 1982-1997 12 -2.79 -3.24***
FDI and GDPDIF 1982-1997 12 -2.81 -3.34***
Countries Tests:
FDI and GDP FDI and GDPDIF
ADF lags ADF lags
Canada -3.87 1 -1.99 0
France -2.78 3 -2.38 3
Germany -1.11 0 -2.82 1
Italy -2.12 1 -1.85 1
Netherlands -4.04 3 -8.17 3
Spain -2.50 2 -1.51 0
United Kingdom -2.10 0 -2.20 0
Mexico -1.79 3 -2.40 0
Indonesia -3.70 3 -3.90 3
Malaysia -2.22 3 -1.65 0
Philippines -3.39 2 -2.01 0
Thailand -3.88 3 -2.87 3
The tests statistics are distributed as N(0;1) under the null of no-cointegration. The test statistics are
constructed using small sample adjustment factors from Pedroni (2003).
*** Rejects the null at the 1% level.
38Table 6: Error Correction and Short Term Dynamics [Equation (11)]
[FDI on GDP] ¸1 Á11i1 Á11i2 Á11i3 Á12i1 Á12i2 Á12i3
Canada -0.036 -0.017 { { 0.376 { {
(0.823) (0.968) (0.635)
France -0.263 0.310 { { 0.305 { {
(0.312) (0.509) (0.945)
Germany -0.015 -0.075 { { 0.761 { {
(0.882) (0.822) (0.463)
Italy -0.570 0.467 -0.156 { -3.023 0.097 {
(0.008) (0.093) (0.557) (0.263) (0.966)
Netherlands -1.277 0.901 0.483 0.857 4.323 3.787 -0.670
(0.001) (0.002) (0.031) (0.003) (0.086) (0.090) (0.712)
Spain -0.149 -0.164 { { 4.689 { {
(0.469) (0.693) (0.273)
United Kingdom -0.759 0.260 { { -2.529 { {
(0.036) (0.419) (0.137)
Mexico -0.532 0.472 { { 0.371 { {
(0.016) (0.162) (0.745)
Indonesia -0.312 0.244 -0.276 { 10.686 2.634 {
(0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.000) (0.078)
Malaysia -0.294 0.026 { { 2.512 { {
(0.059) (0.912) (0.107)
Philippines 0.135 -0.389 { { 0.669 { {
(0.156) (0.242) (0.571)
Thailand -0.549 -0.060 0.186 1.015 6.563 -1.354 3.739
(0.073) (0.868) (0.448) (0.007) (0.015) (0.470) (0.143)
Likelihood Ratio Testsa)
All Countries
Full Sample Test of ¸1 106.608
(0.000)
Full Sample Test of all Á11 91.844
(0.000)
Full Sample Test of all Á12 97.681
(0.000)
a) Under the null of a parameter zero in every country, the likelihood ratio test is distributed as a
Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. Figures in parentheses
are p-values.
39Table 7: Error Correction and Short Term Dynamics [Equation (11)]
[FDI on GDPDIF] ¸1 Á11i1 Á11i2 Á11i3 Á12i1 Á12i2 Á12i3
Canada -0.299 -0.045 0.411 { 0.020 { 0.030 {
(0.044) (0.892) (0.181) (0.818) (0.762)
France -0.500 0.309 0.810 0.719 0.123 0.180 0.356
(0.139) (0.385) (0.073) (0.081) (0.473) (0.237) (0.031)
Germany -0.433 0.212 { { 0.037 { {
(0.066) (0.466) (0.310)
Italy -0.765 -0.333 -0.243 -0.445 -0.919 -0.357 -0.392
(0.012) (0.269) (0.124) (0.051) (0.058) (0.069) (0.033)
Netherlands -0.309 0.645 { { -0.269 { {
(0.178) (0.112) (0.600)
Spain -0.236 0.161 { { { 0.203 { {
(0.384) (0.658) (0.768)
United Kingdom -0.215 -0.008 { { 0.383 { {
(0.460) (0.984) (0.495)
Mexico -1.865 2.534 -0.025 1.426 1.257 0.338 -1.019
(0.068) (0.017) (0.959) (0.036) (0.075) (0.485) (0.130)
Indonesia -0.268 0.467 -0.034 { 0.370 0.817 {
(0.040) (0.193) (0.897) (0.679) (0.262)
Malaysia -0.300 0.327 { { -0.673 { {
(0.078) (0.151) (0.217)
Philippines 0.045 -0.129 { { 0.920 { {
(0.519) (0.727) (0.252)




Full Sample Test of ¸1 76.352
(0.000)
Full Sample Test of all Á11 75.073
(0.000)
Full Sample Test of all Á12 70.964
(0.000)
a) Under the null of a parameter zero in every country, the likelihood ratio test is distributed as a
Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. Figures in parentheses are
p-values.
40Table 8: Granger Causality Tests (FDI & GDP)
Null Hypothesis: Period Lag F-Statistic p-value
FDI Does Not Granger Cause GDP
Canada 1982-97 2 4.620 0.042
France 1982-97 1 11.398 0.006
Germany 1982-97 2 0.239 0.792
Italy 1982-97 3 14.178 0.004
Netherlands 1982-97 1 2.343 0.152
Spain 1982-97 1 5.830 0.033
United Kingdom 1982-97 2 1.564 0.261
Mexico 1982-97 1 0.040 0.845
Indonesia 1982-97 1 0.405 0.537
Malaysia 1982-97 3 28.522 0.001
Philippines 1982-97 2 9.223 0.007
Thailand 1982-97 2 0.031 0.970
GDP Does Not Granger Cause FDI
Canada 1982-97 1 0.029 0.867
France 1982-97 1 0.030 0.866
Germany 1982-97 1 0.419 0.529
Italy 1982-97 1 8.342 0.014
Netherlands 1982-97 2 1.269 0.327
Spain 1982-97 1 0.407 0.536
United Kingdom 1982-97 1 0.031 0.863
Mexico 1982-97 1 9.020 0.011
Indonesia 1982-97 3 25.953 0.001
Malaysia 1982-97 1 9.754 0.009
Philippines 1982-97 3 3.492 0.090
Thailand 1982-97 1 6.267 0.028
41Table 9: Granger Causality Tests (FDI & GDPDIF)
Null Hypothesis: Period Lag F-Statistic p-value
FDI Does Not Granger Cause GDPDIF
Canada 1982-97 1 2.188 0.165
France 1982-97 1 12.725 0.004
Germany 1982-97 1 1.430 0.255
Italy 1982-97 2 1.285 0.323
Netherlands 1982-97 1 4.112 0.065
Spain 1982-97 1 3.541 0.084
United Kingdom 1982-97 1 1.313 0.274
Mexico 1982-97 3 8.032 0.016
Indonesia 1982-97 1 2.308 0.155
Malaysia 1982-97 1 0.074 0.791
Philippines 1982-97 1 1.482 0.247
Thailand 1982-97 2 6.463 0.018
GDPDIF Does Not Granger Cause FDI
Canada 1982-97 1 1.379 0.263
France 1982-97 3 1.924 0.227
Germany 1982-97 1 2.615 0.132
Italy 1982-97 3 23.083 0.001
Netherlands 1982-97 1 0.716 0.414
Spain 1982-97 1 0.391 0.543
United Kingdom 1982-97 1 0.141 0.714
Mexico 1982-97 2 0.655 0.543
Indonesia 1982-97 2 1.315 0.316
Malaysia 1982-97 1 13.783 0.003
Philippines 1982-97 1 0.052 0.823
Thailand 1982-97 1 0.034 0.856
42Table 10: Panel Granger Causality Tests
Null Hypothesis: Null Hypothesis:
FDI Does Not Granger Cause GDP GDP Does Not Granger Cause FDI
Number of Countries Rejecting Number of Countries Rejecting
Null at the 10% Signi¯cance Levela) 6 Null at the 10% Signi¯cance Levela) 6
Percentage 50.0% Percentage 50.0%
(0.000) (0.000)
Full Sample Likelihood Ratio Testb) 112.281 Full Sample Likelihood Ratio Testb) 79.469
(0.000) (0.000)
Null Hypothesis: Null Hypothesis:
FDI Does Not Granger Cause GDPDIF GDPDIF Does Not Granger Cause FDI
Number of Countries Rejecting Number of Countries Rejecting
Null at the 10% Signi¯cance Levela) 5 Null at the 10% Signi¯cance Levela) 2
Percentage 41.7% Percentage 16.7%
(0.004) (0.230)
Full Sample Likelihood Ratio Testb) 66.325 Full Sample Likelihood Ratio Testb) 64.823
(0.000) (0.000)
a) The percentage of countries rejecting the null hypothesis of the Granger causality tests at the 10% level is
distributed as a binomial with critical values of 38.7% at 1%, 26.9% at 5%, 24.2% at 10%. Figures in parentheses
are p-values.
b) The likelihood ratio test is distributed as a Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restric-
tions. Figures in parentheses are p-values.
43Table 11: Error Correction and Short Term Dynamics [Equation (12)]
[FDI on GDP] ¸1 Á11i1 Á11i2 Á11i3 Á12i1 Á12i2 Á12i3
Canada 0.121 0.012 { { 0.736 { {
(0.005) (0.897) (0.001)
France -0.069 0.050 { { -0.407 { {
(0.006) (0.191) (0.261)
Germany 0.068 0.008 { { 0.582 { {
(0.042) (0.934) (0.084)
Italy -0.092 0.081 0.046 { -0.671 -0.582 {
(0.002) (0.022) (0.159) (0.053) (0.055)
Netherlands -0.025 0.029 -0.008 0.054 0.356 -0.196 -0.331
(0.296) (0.191) (0.724) (0.047) (0.270) (0.474) (0.250)
Spain -0.037 0.041 { { 0.240 { {
(0.020) (0.162) (0.397)
United Kingdom -0.073 0.038 { { 0.444 { {
(0.169) (0.451) (0.102)
Mexico -0.008 0.208 { { -0.504 { {
(0.915) (0.132) (0.289)
Indonesia -0.005 0.023 { { 0.144 { {
(0.769) (0.356) (0.715)
Malaysia -0.121 0.069 0.071 { -0.109 -0.279 {
(0.000) (0.006) (0.002) (0.366) (0.039)
Philippines 0.074 -0.109 { { 0.489 { {
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)




Full Sample Test of ¸1 135.777
(0.000)
Full Sample Test of all Á11 75.435
(0.000)
Full Sample Test of all Á12 89.482
(0.000)
a) Under the null of a parameter zero in every country, the likelihood ratio test is distributed as a
Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. Figures in parentheses
are p-values.
44Table 12: Error Correction and Short Term Dynamics [Equation (12)]
[FDI on GDPDIF] ¸1 Á11i1 Á11i2 Á11i3 Á12i1 Á12i2 Á12i3
Canada -0.672 0.107 { { 0.339 { {
(0.058) (0.914) (0.267)
France -0.902 0.532 { { 0.260 { {
(0.008) (0.339) (0.184)
Germany -2.665 3.774 { { -0.130 { {
(0.148) (0.128) (0.652)
Italy -0.121 -0.667 { { -0.128 { {
(0.512) (0.204) (0.794)
Netherlands -0.773 0.899 0.437 0.807 -0.519 -0.311 -0.784
(0.012) (0.039) (0.081) (0.037) (0.205) (0.265) (0.073)
Spain -0.327 0.194 0.113 { -0.723 -0.665 {
(0.008) (0.115) (0.287) (0.011) (0.018)
United Kingdom -0.038 -0.012 -0.005 { -0.750 -0.616 {
(0.860) (0.964) (0.982) (0.073) (0.076)
Mexico -0.782 0.259 0.445 { -0.451 -0.653 {
(0.003) (0.085) (0.038) (0.022) (0.004)
Indonesia 0.037 -0.035 { { -0.539 { {
(0.514) (0.771) (0.117)
Malaysia 0.363 0.136 -0.263 -0.210 -1.217 -0.297 -0.250
(0.031) (0.340) (0.157) (0.206) (0.059) (0.345) (0.394)
Philippines 0.040 -0.199 { { -0.445 { {
(0.154) (0.178) (0.154)
Thailand -0.913 0.226 0.350 { 1.388 0.631 {
(0.001) (0.118) (0.005) (0.010) (0.016)
Likelihood Ratio Testsa)
All Countries
Full Sample Test of ¸1 111.802
(0.000)
Full Sample Test of all Á11 78.622
(0.000)
Full Sample Test of all Á12 94.715
(0.000)
a) Under the null of a parameter zero in every country, the likelihood ratio test is distributed as a
Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. Figures in parentheses are
p-values.
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